India’s Changing Education Policy, 1986-2020

Olivia Banerjee

The 1986 policy document or NPE carried a heavy emphasis on universalising education to improve literacy rates and remove stagnation in education. Reducing disparities by providing technocratic facilities of infrastructure, teachers, etc, it aimed to achieve equality among diverse Indian communities of various castes, creeds, religions, and genders. Through schemes like universalising elementary education, as per the RTE Act, reducing drop-outs, and promoting non-formal education for the remotest part to access, the policy formulates an outlook towards the largely followed democratic national paradigm of anti-poverty alleviation politics (NPE, 1986, p.6). Simultaneously it aimed to inculcate an attitude of awareness for all cultural, social, and economic realities (Ibid, pp. 156-164)

A quick search through the policy document reveals the word ‘technology’ parading around 114 times. There was a call to move away from traditional methods to focus instead on distance learning, where students could complete a course at their own pace and not attend the classroom set-up, but rather use online methods for completion (Ibid, p. 50). The opening of the Indira Gandhi National Open University in 1985 was in line with this policy focus. This focus on scientific and technological development through using capabilities of television and audio programmes for learning, providing computer skills and science education in institutions, and using it for educational development promoted a twist, hereof. IGNOU executes its programmes with global overseas partnerships. Simultaneously, such non-formal methods of teaching sat along with the stressed focus on un-aided programmes, like, purely private and self-autonomous colleges (Ibid, p. 157).

Parallelly, notable in the policy document is an emphasis on vocationalisation of education, which would enhance individual employability. Such courses or institutions would be set up by both public and private sectors, and be provided after the secondary stage to prepare students for identified occupations (Ibid, pp. 30-41).

The post-independence Nehruvian governance, fundamentally built on socialist ideals, with a focus on state-controlled capitalism and moving away from primordial identities, did not promise economic growth for India. Largely, international anxieties developed due to South Korea achieving massive results in NIC, and China and the Soviet Union embracing the global market. During Indira Gandhi’s first term in particular, the previous linkage with colonialism no longer worked as a justification for this fallout, but rather socialist policies of redistribution, excessive public investment, and failed land reforms were cited as major problems (Kohli, pp. 308-11). Following this fallout, pro-socialism and secularism were debunked in the wave of Hindu majoritarian identity politics. Since the Hindu majority also constituted the majority of the poor in the country, Hindu-chauvinism and pro-business propaganda were championed during the Janata Party rule, instead of the upper-middle class groups favoured during the Nehruvian governance.

Considering the prevalent political climate, Indira Gandhi’s return to political power in 1980, after the short break post-Emergency, ushered enormously changed political attitudes and economic deliberations. While the rhetorical image of poverty alleviation and promoting socialist ideals along the earlier Congress lines were intact, now the economic policies she undertook completely moved away from the earlier state-controlled economy model (McCartney, 2009, p. 213). Industrial policy growth, which was stagnant during her earlier regime, reached new heights under Morarji Desai. The technocrats drafting these hypotheses also changed—from the earlier generation with Left-leaning training from England to the newer ones emerging from American universities. These training institutions also inculcated a consensus about the desired direction of development, which now meant a shift to liberalisation and globalisation (Chakravarty, 1984, p. 11).

Indira Gandhi, then to keep her political appeal in place, became the key initiator for the reform of India’s economic policy. IMF contracts and World Bank deals also ushered a growing change in the direction of economic policies (Haggard, 1985, p. 532). But when Rajiv Gandhi came in power through massive sympathy, after his mother’s assassination, he advanced the policies of tariff relaxation and private investments almost vehemently. The 1985 budget called out openly in favour of liberalisation, without any mention of earlier socialist appeals and community appeasements. This received a massive critique from within the Congress fold, the regional Left organisations, like, CPIM, and the urban and rural poor (Datta, 1985, p. 696).

As Kohli theorises, late 1985-1986 was the time of Rajiv Gandhi’s ‘two-step forward and one-step backward’ policies (Kohli, 1989, p. 311). The 1986 NPE is nestled in this context. The policy oscillated between the Indian socialist policies of public spending, the aim of educational universalisation, and the massive shift to adopt non-formal technological modes of teaching, creating private partnerships and vocationalisation. This could be easily perceived as Rajiv Gandhi’s diversion tactic to hold his political power. After the initial intra-Congress attack and Left ignition, he deliberated in an interview that the earlier mixed model economy would be in place. But certainly, business groups like FCCI and the urban middle class have supported him, in favour of India trying to slowly grapple with the global forces, and increased chance of getting access to global services and consumable products, for the latter (Varshney, 1984, p. 1515).

A vehement focus on the Fourth Industrial Revolution’s demand, as one would see in the NPE 1986 would mean a sign of political incompetency again. It holds within it the earlier nationalist motivation of public spending to hold the marginalised communities who need such interventionist schemes. The regional focus captures the anxieties of Indian families about falling out in the English paraphernalia. Secondly, through vocationalisation, it appeals to middle-class sensibilities of acquiring jobs through what they study, as seen in the Western context. De-linking of degrees from jobs appealed to the tremendous difficulty of not acquiring adequate employability after completion of courses, hence promoting a need for another chance. Private entry also captures the upper-middle class or rising middle-class dream to reach foreign centres. IGNOU and the Navodaya schools mark the dualism of capitalism perfectly, as theorised (Bowles, 1980). It aims to provide the marginalised that are unable to attend regularly to focus on earning to continue their education at their own pace, and for the latter, gives scope to attend quality education for those who are talented. The private partnerships in the first and the elitist bias on merit prove the falsity in these two cases. Globali-sation marking a mobilisation of individual choice and self-independence gets promoted highly in the detailed provisions, ushering a change in the state-interventionist policies.

End to Hide-and-Seek
The National Education Policy 2020 put forward by the Kasturirangan Committee, presents a complete revamping of educational sector by the central government led by Bharatiya Janata Party[BJP], after three decades. The complete change in pedagogy, curriculum, teaching, institutions, educational opportunities, and employment map out a new vision for Indian education.

To quote directly from the policy: it aims to address the “goals of the 21st century, including SDG4, while building upon Indian traditions and value systems” (NEP 2020, p.3). 21st-century precursors on the growth of the knowledge economy and digital advancement, and Sustainable Development Goals 4, dictated by UNESCO, talk of a commitment to promote an inclusive and equitable education, providing learning opportunities to everyone (UNESCO). In short, it aims to address the current neo-liberal economic framework of a globalised world.

Addressing the above concern, the principles of the policy adorn itself with adjectives like “holistic”, “multidisciplinary”, “flexible”, “light but tight regulatory framework”, etc (NEP 2020, p. 4-6). The “notion of a ‘knowledge of many arts’ or what in modern times is often called the liberal arts” is articulated as the holistic plan of NEP, along with the demands of the 21st century (Ibid, p. 36). The purpose suggests a practice of liberal arts, humanities, and social sciences within technical and vocational fields in a multidisciplinary fulcrum. It talks of bringing back the Indian culture of cultivating Banabhatta’s 64 arts—a merge of arts, scientific fields, professional fields, vocational fields, and soft skills (Ibid, p. 36). Parallelly, it aims to address the goals of technological development, data revolution, and market orientation focusing more on science-based knowledge (Ibid, p. 58). For the same purpose, it focuses on skill training, which would increase the employable opportunity of the individual in question, and also put a significant emphasis on self-reliance.

Skill learning, multidisciplinarity, and holistic learning are demands of the contemporary global market, consolidating the adaptation of the policies of liberalisation, privatisation, and globalisation in 1991. The heavy increase of private spending in every sector, a world of multinational companies, and the formulation of an interconnected global network grapple with the present reality of India. But the development has not come about so well, in the Western context as in the South Asian space.

As Ganguly-Scrase and Scrase argue, with globalisation, several precarities are born. This will help to understand the context of the policy in question. The growing emphasis on IITs sits in line with rapid technological development, which generates a need for highly skilled and trained workers (Ganguly-Scrase and Scrase, 2009, pp. 137-140). With the opening of scopes of ‘Private Philanthropic Partnerships’, where private NGOs can fund institutions, it shows a trend toward prioritisation of market forces over state regulation. This trend is similar to what people account for in the IGNOU case and vocationalisation pattern in 1986, but with more revamped and direct articulation now.

The population is anxious to gain a simultaneous stress on English proficiency. This pattern of an Anglicised, westernised education led to the creation of the upper middle class in Calcutta to maintain a link with the colonial British officials and the general Indian regional mass. The gained proficiency also accelerated the mobility of social and cultural capital in the pockets of only a selected few (Ibid, p. 135). The tension of this growing social divide envelops the academic reality. With the clear diction of stressing regional language learning till Grade 5 [preferably till Grade 8), and strengthening community participation in education, the move is yet again of the government to articulate the anxieties of the population. The policy captures the suspicion-laden future of the young population and presents itself to respond to such growing insecurities. With provisions to stop rote learning, accelerate multidisciplinarity, and focus on skill learning for building self-reliance, it is radical enough to counter the elitist base in education. It aims to raise the level of Indian education to such a height that it stops the current ‘brain drain phenomenon’, where students with higher education move out to Western institutions for future plans (Ibid, p. 136).

But is that all there is to it? One finds that the earlier state interventionist schemes adopted in 1986 are transformed in 2020 to fit a globalised political language. It is not through special scholarships or Navodaya School, or talent search examinations that the problem is dealt with, but rather a neo-liberal policy where the entire curriculum is changed to address the demands of the social movements on language, gender, class, caste and creed. The fundamental tension lies in the focus of two things: skill learning and multidisciplinarity. The Greek-Latin epistemological delineation of liberal education, speaks of Trivium or Quadrivium structures of liberal education, where subjects like grammar, logic, rhetoric or arithmetic, astronomy, music, and geometry are brought in an interdisciplinary synergy (Palmer, 2016). The fundamental feud of interdisciplinarity and the NEP-celebrated multidisciplinary presents the hidden aim of this policy. NEP boasts of learning ‘cognitive skills’, across all stages, be it Early Childhood Care, Schooling Stage, or Higher Learning Stages. This cognitive skill is different from interdisciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity tries to transcend the limits of one’s own discipline, questions it, and aims to go hand in hand with other disciplines. On the contrary, multi-disciplinarity makes a multitasking worker by training learners in some fundamental, rudimentary principles across all fields, producing an individual who, for example, can do basic coding, has basic sociological training, knows certain medical work (such as like giving first aid), etc. Multidisciplinarity discards specialisations, but rather offers some basic tools for maintaining quality of employability. What started with vocationalisation in 1986 now ends in a lifelong earning pattern in 2020. A second contradiction is advanced with the heavy focus to gain new work experiences, ace English proficiency and crack entrance examinations. It is necessary to keep in mind the middle-class mindset to complete student life within their twenties. Within that small span, if a student is compelled to learn and grow intellectually and be burdened with expanding CVs, it resurfaces rote-learning to get everything done, which NEP claims to reduce. While this only provides a middle-class view, the fight for the labouring class becomes more precarious. The policy’s focus on ‘skill development’, however, follows only one definition or type of skill—the skill to enter the job market. The government, with its heavy dependence on the US for a number of sectors and simultaneous competition with other global powers, has adopted this policy to keep its political and economic hold in place.

Utility or Non-Utility
It is better to see 1986 as the part of the first phase of globalisation, and 2020 as part of the second phase. The state during 1986 was crisis-ridden and made way for the industrial class to move into global connections. The opening of IGNOU and earlier attempts at privatisation links with the LPG policy of 1991. The LPG re-oriented the economy to serve the interests of capital, moved heavily to IMF, and relied on global guidelines. The NEP 2020 has realised the goals of rampant relaxation of boundaries. With the lowering of public funding in education, which started in 1986 as a political act the BJP government— with massive expenditure on MOE signing, online education, and incorporation of unaided skill courses with aided courses—has destabilised the entire economic base. The marketisation of educational production is ensured with the management of labour economy, quality control, and internationalisation of its relations. Those rendered unemployable in the 1986 policies are incorporated into the fulcrum through the multidisciplinarity and skill base incorporated by the 2020 policy. Globalised standards, getting introduced in NEP 2020 fill the elitist quota. Earlier, in 1986, the stress was on institutions of competitiveness, but with provisions of MOU with foreign universities, and foreign faculties in planning, the rising level of precarity has increased, with a more sensed stress on education. The technological focus which was not so clear in 1986 becomes firm in the 2020 policy.

What could not be realised after the 1986 policy for various movements, gets realised in 2020. But it is not a clue to see it as a statist agenda alone. The policy, as shown in this essay, sits in line with the aspirations of the population already affected by consumerist markets, looking for foreign jobs for a better future, etc. But the anxiety of what the image of India is going to be in the globalised paradigm is highlighted by the focus on the non-utilitarian aspect of the policies. Both policies stress regional language learning, appreciating the culture of India, and adopting an Indian civic value and ethics. The 2020 policy exhausts it even more with a dual focus on Indian civics and ethics and an aim towards global citizenship. This presents the contradiction between the focus on the utilitarian motive of education and the teaching of culture focusing on the non-utilitarian aspect. The government adopts this policy at a time when they are facing a failure, the assassination and Emergency backlash for Rajiv Gandhi and the CAA protest for Modi. The revamped policies usher in this contradiction. It is not a question of good or bad, terrible or better, but rather who can bind the contradictions together for changing times. Just like the birth of Philosophy for Hegel, the policy aims to address these contradictions and keep the government in place.

References:
1.    Bowles, S. (1980). Education, Class Conflict and Uneven Development. In The Education Dilemma by John Simmons (ed), Pergamon Press, Oxford.
2.    Chakravarty, S. (1984). India’s Development Strategy for the 1980s. Economic and Political Weekly.
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7.    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (n.d.). Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG4).
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9.    McCartney, M. (2009). ‘Episodes’ or ‘Evolution’: The Genesis of Liberalisation in India. Journal of South Asian Development, 4(2), 203-228.
10.    National Policy on Education, 1986 (As modified in 1992) (PDF). HRD Ministry. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 November 2010. Retrieved 3 March 2011.
11.    NEP (2020): Policy document released by Government of India.
12.    Palmer, M. (2016). Shaping Lives, Shaping Cultures: The Story of Liberal Arts Education in the Middle Ages. Paul W. Lewis and Martin William Mittelstadt (eds.), What’s So Liberal About the Liberal Arts? Integrated Approaches to Christian Formation (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2016, Frameworks: Interdisciplinary Studies for Faith and Learning, 2016), 23-42.
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14.     Varshney. A. (1984). Political economy of slow, economic growth in India. Economic and Political Weekly. September 1, 1511-1517.

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